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Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: 
Lemkins Word, Darfur, and the UN Report 
David Luban* 
I . INTRODUCTION :  THE DISAPPEARING GENOCIDE  
IN DARFUR  
Every student of a foreign language learns about false friendswords in 
a new language that look like words in your own but mean something different. 
In French, expérience means experiment, not experience. In German 
Konkurrenz means competition, while the English concurrence means 
agreementin antitrust terms, the opposite of competition. 
Legal language, too, contains false friendstechnical legal terms that 
closely resemble words in ordinary language but mean something different. 
Twenty-five years ago, as a young philosophy teacher with no legal training, I 
taught my first case ever in a law school classroom. It contained the word 
consideration, and I proceeded on the natural assumption that a good 
consideration means an important thing to think about rather than a thing 
of value given to form a contract. The results were predictably comic. 
But the result can be tragic as well. On January 25, 2005, the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (UN Commission or Commission) 
presented its report (UN Darfur Report or Report) to UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan.1 The Commission, chaired by the eminent international 
jurist Antonio Cassese, did a meticulous job of investigating possible 
                                                 
* Frederick Haas Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center; Leah 
Kaplan Visiting Professor of Human Rights, Stanford Law School. I have presented this paper at 
the Fribourg/Georgetown conference on human rights, Charmey, Switzerland; McGeorge Law 
School; and the Stanford Global Justice Workshop and Law School Faculty Workshop. I wish to 
thank the participants for their many helpful comments. Thanks as well to Markus Wagner for 
research assistance and illuminating discussions. 
1  United Nations, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General (2005), available online at <http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf> 
(visited Apr 5, 2006) (hereinafter UN Darfur Report). 
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international crimes in Darfur. Newspaper headlines summarized the Cassese 
Commissions findings a few days later: U.N. Finds Crimes, Not Genocide in 
Darfur,2 U.N. Panel Finds No Genocide in Darfur but Urges Tribunals,3 MurderBut 
No Genocide,4 Darfur Criminal But Not Genocide,5 and Sudans Darfur Crimes Not 
Genocide, Says U.N. Report.6 Nearly identical headlines appeared in the Chicago 
Tribune,7 the Queensland Courier Mail,8 the St. Petersburg Times,9 the Irish 
Times,10 and the Financial Times.11  
Most revealing are headlines from the Herald Sun in Melbourne (Horrors 
Short of Genocide),12 the Glasgow Herald (UN Clears Sudan of Genocide in Darfur),13 
and Londons Daily Telegraph (UN Confusion as Sudan Conflict is No Longer 
Genocide).14 Plainly, short of genocide means not as bad as genocide. 
Clears Sudan of genocide means exonerationand, coming just two days 
after headlines declaring that Sudanese officials denied bombing a village in 
Darfur, headline-scanners could be excused for believing that the UN report had 
disproven atrocity reports in Darfur. And UN confusion as the Darfur 
catastrophe is no longer genocide shows the baleful results. The UN no 
longer knew what to do, because without the word genocide, the mandate for 
action disappears. 
Months earlier, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell had labeled 
the Darfur atrocities genocide.15 Many people remembered that the Clinton 
administration went through humiliating contortions to avoid the G-word out 
                                                 
2  Warren Hoge, UN Finds Crimes, Not Genocide in Darfur, NY Times A3 (Feb 1, 2005). 
3  Colum Lynch, UN Panel Finds No Genocide in Darfur but Urges Tribunals, Wash Post A01 (Feb 1, 
2005). 
4  MurderBut No Genocide, Scotsman 25 (Feb 2, 2005). 
5  Darfur Criminal But Not Genocide, Australian 10 (Feb 2, 2005). 
6  Ewen MacAskill, Sudans Darfur Crimes Not Genocide, Says UN Report, Guardian (London) 12 (Feb 
1, 2005). 
7  UN Panel: Darfur Abuses Systematic, Not Genocide, Chi Trib 5 (Feb 1, 2005). 
8  Evelyn Leopold, Sudanese Killings Not Genocide: UN, Courier Mail (Queensland) 15 (Feb 2, 2005). 
9  UN Panel Sees No Genocide in Darfur, St Petersburg Times (Florida) 2A (Feb 1, 2005). 
10  Ewen MacAskill, No Proof of Genocide in Sudan, UN Study Finds, Irish Times 8 (Feb 1, 2005). 
11  Mark Turner, Sudan Killings in Darfur Not Genocide, Says UN Report, Fin Times 7 (Feb 1, 2005).  
12  Horrors Short of Genocide, Herald Sun (Melbourne) 34 (Feb 2, 2005). 
13  Daniel Balint-Kurti Abuja, UN Clears Sudan of Genocide in Darfur, Herald (Glasgow) 10 (Feb 1, 
2005). 
14  Alec Russel, UN Confusion as Sudan Conflict is No Longer Genocide, Daily Telegraph (London) 12 
(Feb 2, 2005). A nearly identical headline appeared in The Mercury of Australia. 
15  Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, The Crisis in Darfur, Written Remarks to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (Sept 9, 2004), available online at <http://www.usembassy.it/ 
file2004_09/alia/A4090908.htm> (visited Apr 5, 2006). 
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of fear of being required to do something about genocide in Rwanda.16 Powells 
forthright use of the forbidden word suggested to many that the Bush 
administration would be differentbetter and more honest. Not on my 
watch, were George W. Bushs famous words about genocide inaction.17 
Bolstering the hope that the United States would help halt the Darfur atrocities 
was the fact that Christian groups belonging to President Bushs core 
constituency were pushing for US action.18 These groups had been concerned 
about Sudan for years because of the massacre of Christians in the North-South 
civil warand now, for admirable reasons of principle, they were not about to 
back off simply because the victims were Muslims. In 2004, the US Congress 
passed a resolution condemning the Darfur atrocities, and self-consciously 
labeled them genocide.19 
It was less well-known that, contrary to the fears of the Clinton 
administration, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (Genocide Convention) imposes no legal obligation to act.20 
Nevertheless, existing political pressure on both the United Nations and the 
United States ultimately might have turned the tide. At least, until the UN 
Commissions report deflated the sense of urgency about Darfur. In Spring 
2005, both houses of the US Congress introduced tough legislation on behalf of 
Darfurthe Darfur Accountability Act.21 By that time, however, Colin Powell 
was gone and the Bush administration, preoccupied with Iraq, did not want a 
mandate to do something drastic in Sudan. The White House wrote to 
Congressional leaders requesting removal of the strongest portion of the Darfur 
Accountability Acta broad authorization to actfrom a crucial appropriations 
                                                 
16  Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories 
from Rwanda 15253 (Farrar, Straus 1998) (quoting and discussing press statements made on June 
10, 1994 by a State Department spokesperson). 
17  Elizabeth Rubin, If Not Peace, Then Justice, NY Times Magazine 42 (Apr 2, 2006). 
18  Samantha Power, Dying in Darfur, New Yorker 56 (Aug 30, 2004). 
19  H Con Res 467, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (June 24, 2004). 
20  Article 1 of the Genocide Convention obligates its parties to undertake to prevent and to 
punish the crime of genocide, but Article 6 makes it clear that the obligation to punish genocide 
applies only to genocide committed within the states own territory, and international lawyers 
generally assume that the legal obligation to prevent genocide has no wider extension than 
genocide within a states own territory. This conclusion is reinforced by Article 8, which states 
that parties to the Convention may call on the UN Security Council to take actions for prevention 
and suppression of genocide. There is no suggestion that states must act on their own to suppress 
genocide in other states. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Jan 12, 1951), 78 UNTS 277 (hereinafter Genocide Convention). See generally William 
A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes 491502 (Cambridge 2000). 
21  Darfur Accountability Act of 2005, S 495, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 2, 2005); Darfur Peace and 
Accountability Act, HR 3127, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (June 30, 2005). 
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bill and in May Congress complied.22 Although President Bush quickly reiterated 
the view that genocide is occurring in Darfur, he did so only after the Darfur 
Accountability Act had been weakened at the White Houses request.23 
Obviously, we will never be certain that the UN Darfur Report directly 
deflated the Bush administrations commitment to Darfur action. But the 
Report, together with the resulting news reports, made the struggle for Darfur 
intervention more difficult by undercutting efforts by Darfur action groups to 
mobilize public support. With headlines such as MurderBut No Genocide,24 the 
motivation to intervene was gone. Murder is bad, to be surebut murder is 
ordinary. One might lobby Congress to do something about genocide, but who 
ever heard of lobbying Congress to stop foreigners from murdering each other? 
Foreigners murder each other all the time. Genocide sounds like it might be our 
business, but mere murder is theirs. 
Strikingly, all those damaging headlines actually reflected a horrible 
misunderstanding of the UN Commissions conclusions. The Report contained 
no factual exonerations. More importantly, the Report insisted that the war 
crimes and crimes against humanity that it found in Darfur are just as evil and 
just as legally significant as genocide. However, the Commission made this point 
in a maddeningly legalistic manner: it pointed out that trial chambers in the 
Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals had referred to genocide as the crime of 
crimesbut they were reversed by their Appellate Chambers, which held that 
there is no hierarchy among international crimes.25 This pettifogging mode of 
argument vividly illustrates how disconnected the law of genocide has become 
from the generally accepted meaning of the word. To everyone in the world 
other than a handful of international lawyers, genocide is the crime of crimes, 
regardless of what the judges on Appellate Chambers in The Hague say. And the 
Commissions effort to insist that the crimes in Darfur are not genocide (though 
they are just as evil) not only swims upstream against the force of language, it 
argues its conclusion not on moral or factual grounds, but on the grounds that a 
                                                 
22  Mark Leon Goldberg, Zoellicks Appeasement Tour, American Prospect 4 (Apr, 2005) (describing 
Apr 25, 2005 letter from the White Houses Office of Management and Budget to Rep Jerry 
Lewis); Nicholas D. Kristof, Day 113 of the Presidents Silence, NY Times A25 (May 3, 2005) (stating 
that the author has a copy of President Bushs letter to Congressional leaders instructing them to 
delete provisions about Darfur from the legislation). 
23  Unsurprisingly, then, the announcement of the Presidents statement that genocide is happening 
in Darfur was buried deep in the inside pages of the Washington Post. See Jim VandeHei, In 
Break With UN, Bush Calls Sudan Killings Genocide, Wash Post A19 (June 2, 2005). 
24  MurderBut No Genocide, Scotsman at 25 (cited in note 4). 
25  See UN Darfur Report at 12829, ¶¶ 50506 (cited in note 1). For a powerful argument in favor 
of the hierarchy of crimes view, see Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in 
International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 Va L Rev 415, 47283 (2001). 
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handful of judges say so. The Commissions conclusion that the situation in 
Darfur was not a genocide turned on fine points of the technical definition of 
genocide contained in the Genocide Convention and subsequently incorporated 
into the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute and national legislation. 
Thus, when the Melbourne Herald Sun said that Darfur falls short of 
genocide,26 it actually misrepresented the UN Darfur Report, which goes out of 
its way to insist that genocide is not the crime of crimes, and that crimes 
against humanity are every bit as significant. 
Equally striking, however, is the fact that no newspaper accounts actually 
delved into the legal arguments to explain any of this. Apparently, the reporters 
found the no genocide conclusion significant but did not want to strain their 
readers fragile attention with fine-grained technicalities about specific intent, 
protected groups, and destruction of a group as suchthe key legalisms in the 
Genocide Convention.27 This is entirely predictable: newspapers almost never 
explain the legal reasoning behind exciting results. But it probably wouldnt have 
mattered if the newspapers had been more careful. The fact is that the word 
genocide has come to mean something different in the public imagination 
than it means in the law. The word genocide has become a false friend. 
II. THE MAKING OF A FALSE FRIEND  
We tend to be dismissive about debates over word-meaning. Thats just 
semantics is a brusque dismissal in educated circles. Yet words matter. The 
word genocide was coined by a polyglot lawyer named Raphael Lemkin nearly 
sixty years ago. Lemkin understood that without a memorable word he could 
never draw the worlds attention to the uncanny crime that was his lifes 
obsession. His ear for linguistics was impeccable.28 First published in an obscure, 
largely unread, and nearly unreadable law book, Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe29a catalogue raisonné of Nazi legislation in occupied territory that 
revealed its genocidal patternLemkins word eventually conquered the world. 
It became one of the most powerful in any language, and it reshaped the moral 
landscape of the worldarguably, more so than any other single linguistic 
innovation in history. In doing so, it also reshaped our consciousness and, to 
some extent, it reshaped our culture as well. 
                                                 
26  Horrors of Genocide, Herald Sun (Melbourne) at 34 (cited in note 12).  
27  See Genocide Convention, art 2 (cited in note 20).  
28  See generally the splendid chapters on Lemkin in Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America 
and the Age of Genocide (Perennial 2002). On Lemkins quest for the magic word, see id at 4045.  
29  Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for 
Redress 7995 (Carnegie 1944). See also Michael Ignatieff, Lemkins Word, New Republic 25 (Feb 
26, 2001). 
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But words and culture shape each other, and culture did not leave Lemkins 
word untouched. To take one example of cultures pressure on the G-word, we 
now tend to think that genocide is a label reserved for mass murders on the 
scale of the Holocaust. If it is only a few thousand people, there will be those 
who deny that it is genocidea frequent refrain from do-nothings during the 
Balkan Wars. But nothing in Lemkins legal definition specifies a numbers 
requirement, nor should it. The massacre of seven thousand men at Srebrenica 
was just as genocidal as the gassing of millions at Auschwitz and Sobibor. 
Lawyers are right to fight against popular word-meaning on this issue, because 
otherwise it will be more difficult to use Lemkins word to mobilize political 
pressure against early-stage genocides or mass atrocities against smaller groups 
than the European Jews. 
In the UN Darfur Report, the culprit is not the numbers requirement, but 
the fact that the definition of genocide requires that the crime be committed 
with a certain specific intention.30 Prosecutors understand that specific intentions 
are incredibly hard to prove, because criminals can perform the same act with 
many possible intentions, and singling one out may be hard to do without a 
confession or a smoking-gun document. This was precisely the problem that the 
UN Commission confronted. Do the Janjaweed militias and their sponsors in 
Sudans government specifically intend to annihilate the tribes they are targeting 
as entire groups?31 Only if they do is it a genocide in legal terms. Or are they 
acting for other reasonsperhaps to steal land, to crush the insurgency, or to 
create a bloody example for other potential insurgents in Sudan? The evidence 
the UN Commission found supports at least the latter reasons, but, the 
Commission concluded, not the specific intention to annihilate the targeted 
tribes as such.32 Organized extermination of civilian populations regardless of 
specific intent is, under current legal definitions, a crime against humanity. But 
it isnt genocide.  
This is the point at which the legal word genocide becomes a false 
friend. In everyday speech, we think of genocide as deliberate annihilation of 
masses of civilians, regardless of the specific intention. That means that for non-
lawyersindeed, even for lawyers who have never studied the arcana of 
international criminal lawthe crime against humanity of exterminating civilian 
populations is genocide. Hence, when the UN Commission denied that Darfur 
was genocide, non-specialists could only conclude that there was no wholesale 
                                                 
30  See UN Darfur Report at 12425, 128, ¶¶ 489493, 502 (cited in note 1).  
31  For background on the Janjaweed and the Darfur conflict, see id at 1726, ¶¶ 4072, and 3137, 
¶¶ 98126. An excellent and more detailed overview may be found in Gérard Prunier, Darfur: The 
Ambiguous Genocide (Cornell 2005).  
32  UN Darfur Report at 13032, ¶¶ 51322 (cited in note 1).  
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extermination going on in Darfur. That is not what the UN Commission found, 
and it is not what it said. But as the headlines indicate, it obviously is what 
people thought the Commission had found and said. The legal and moral 
meanings of the word genocide have parted ways. As a result, lawyers and 
journalists talk past each other, and politicians suddenly find a convenient 
linguistic excuse for doing nothing. That is not just semantics.33 
III. GENOCIDE AND GROUP PLURALISM  
Lemkin defined genocide thoughtfully, and a deep philosophical point 
lay behind his definition. That point is that ethnic, racial, and religious groups 
possess value as groupsvalue over and above the value of the individuals who 
compose the groups. The individuals are valuable too, of course, and for those 
committed to human rights and human dignity, the value of those individuals is 
incalculable. 
But humanity consists not only of many peopleindividualities in the 
plural. It consists as well of many peoplesa plurality of groups as well as 
individuals. Groups represent ways of life, imaginative visions of the good 
worked out collectively over the course of generations. They represent the many 
forms of human sociality and, in important respects, of human transcendence of 
our finite individuality. For that reason, to annihilate a group is a crime that 
diminishes humanity over and above the loss of the slaughtered individuals. In 
Lemkins words: 
[N]ations are essential elements of the world community. The world 
represents only so much culture and intellectual vigor as are created by its 
component national groups. Essentially the idea of a nation signifies 
constructive cooperation and original contributions, based upon genuine 
traditions, genuine culture, and a well-developed national psychology. The 
destruction of a nation, therefore, results in the loss of its future 
contributions to the world.34 
                                                 
33  This conclusion harmonizes with Beth Van Schaacks argument that the legal concept of 
genocide, devised for use in international tribunals, should be distinguished and disentangled from 
the knotty issues (political, legal, and moral) surrounding humanitarian intervention. Otherwise, 
practical and theoretical objections to humanitarian intervention become obstacles to political 
mobilization against genocidal campaigns. Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 
Whittier L Rev 1101, 1103 (2005). 
34  Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe at 91 (cited in note 29). Michael Ignatieff elaborates on 
Lemkins idea: 
What it means to be a human being, what defines the very identity we share as 
a species, is the fact that we are differentiated by race, religion, ethnicity, and 
individual difference. These differentiations define our identity both as 
individuals and as a species. No other species differentiates itself in this 
individualized abundance. A sense of otherness, of distinctness, is the very 
basis of the consciousness of our individuality, and this consciousness, based 
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Genocide impoverishes the world in the same way that losing an entire 
distinctive speciesthe pandas, the Siberian tigers, the rhinosimpoverishes 
the world over and above the loss of the individual pandas or tigers or rhinos. 
Lemkin discovered a terrible pattern in the opaque mass of Nazi laws and 
regulations in occupied Europe. Oppression and massacre appear throughout 
human history, but Lemkin found something more than oppression and 
massacre. He found an attack on human group plurality itself. He found 
genocide. 
Genos is the Greek word for a clan or tribe, and Lemkin coined his 
terrible word to underscore that the plurality of peoples, with their different 
ways of inhabiting the world, is a basic source of value, notas fanatics would 
have ita threat to the One True Way or the One Authentic Race.35 Thus, as a 
deep pluralist, he focused on groups not as aggregates of individual members, 
but as groups as such. The drafters of the Genocide Convention were faithful to 
Lemkins pluralism when they devised the legal formula that distinguishes 
genocide from other forms of atrocity: genocide involves a specific intent to 
destroy a protected group as such.36 
Independent of Lemkin, the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter came to 
grips in their own way with Nazi rule in Europe. Like Lemkin, they recognized 
that the Nazis practiced policies of atrocity and annihilation that were not 
traditional war crimes. These crimes instead consisted of organized attacks on 
already-conquered civilian populationsand at Nuremberg, these attacks were 
                                                                                                                              
in difference, is a constitutive element of what it is to be a human being. To 
attack any of these differencesto round up women because they are women, 
Jews because they are Jews, whites because they are whites, blacks because 
they are blacks, gays because they are gayis to attack the shared element that 
makes us what we are as a species. 
Ignatieff, Lemkins Word at 2728 (cited in note 29). This gets the idea almost, but not quite, right. 
We are indeed differentiated by race, religion, ethnicity, and individual differencebut the first 
three are differentiations by group, while individual difference is not. Genocide attacks the specific 
value attached to groups, over and above the specific value attached to individual difference. For 
further discussion see David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 Yale J Intl L 89, 114
16 (2004). 
35  Ignatieff insightfully notices that genocidal thinking is utopian thinking: 
The danger of genocide lies in its promise to create a world without enemies. 
Think of genocide as a crime in service of a utopia, a world without discord, 
enmity, suspicion, free of the enemy without or the enemy within. Once we 
understand that this utopia is the core of the genocidal intention, we have to 
realize that this utopia menaces us forever. 
Ignatieff, Lemkins Word at 25 (cited in note 29). 
36  For the moment, I am omitting some words from the legal formula, because, as I suggest, these 
words distort and weaken Lemkins insight. Subsequently I will examine the formula in its 
entirety. 
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labeled crimes against humanity.37 But, the Nuremberg Charters drafters 
approached the task of defining these novel crimes very differently from 
Lemkin, and the result was a definition that did not focus on the values of 
group-pluralism. 
The Nuremberg Charter limited its scope to crimes connected with the 
war.38 But in former Yugoslavia, crimes against humanity were committed in an 
internal armed conflict rather than a traditional war; and in Rwanda they 
occurred in areas of the country untouched by war. Jurists responded by refining 
the definition of crimes against humanity to pare away the war nexus and to 
emphasize the essential quality that turns rapes and murders from domestic 
crimes into crimes against humanity: widespread or systematic attacks on civilian 
populations that result from state or organizational policies.39 The definition 
does not emphasize the nature or value of the victim groups as such. 
We may understand the difference between the legal definitions of 
genocide and crimes against humanity in the following way: the law of crimes 
against humanity focuses on the political, organized, group character of the 
perpetrators, while genocide focuses on the group character of the victims. To 
be sure, by definition, crimes against humanity must be committed against 
civilian populations, that is, against groups. But for the Nuremberg framers, the 
victims could be any civilian population under attack, including populations that 
mix multiple groups.40 There is in fact a studied vagueness in the concept of a 
                                                 
37  Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Aug 8, 1945), art 6(c), 59 Stat 1544, 
1547, 82 UN Treaty Ser 279, 288 (1945) (hereinafter Nuremberg Charter), reprinted in 1 Intl 
Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 19451 October 1946 10 (1947).  
38  Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter defines crimes against humanity as murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated (emphasis added). Id. The crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal referred to in the emphasized phrase are crimes against peace 
(planning or carrying out an aggressive or illegal war) and war crimes. Id at arts 6(a), 6(b). 
39  Luban, 29 Yale J Intl L at 97 (cited in note 34). For the relevant statutory language in its various 
formulations see also id at 16265. For the most current formulation see United Nations, Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/Conf 183/9 (1998) (hereinafter Rome 
Statute). Under this definition, crimes against humanity include any of eleven specified offenses 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack. Id at art 7(1). And an attack against a civilian population is defined as 
multiple commissions of the specific offenses pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack. Id at art 7(2)(a). 
40  Although the Nuremberg Charter does not define the phrase civilian population, article 6(c) 
refers to acts committed against any civilian population, without restriction to political, racial, 
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civilian population, but the most natural way to think of it is territorially. For 
example: the civilian population of the village of Amaki Sara, in Darfur province, 
Sudan has been attacked, and the crimes against humanity of murder and rape 
have been committed. 
From a group-pluralist point of view, the concept of crimes against 
humanity fails precisely because it ignores the specific character of the target 
groups, and the specific intention to diminish humanity by annihilating the 
group as such. To be sure, the crimes against humanity include a crime called 
extermination. But the legal definition, though it requires extermination 
committed in a planned, systematic attack, does not require a specific intent to 
exterminate, nor does it require the targeting of a racial, ethnic, religious, or 
national group as such. From Lemkins point of view, it misses the distinctive 
pluralist dimension of human value that genocide assaults.41  
From a practical point of view, as observed earlier, genocide is a harder 
crime to prove than crimes against humanity, because of the difficulty of 
proving specific intent. But that difficulty would not necessarily faze Lemkin. 
Precisely because genocide is a unique and uncanny crime, it ought to be hard to 
prove, because mere killers, even mass killers, should not be convicted unless 
they truly intend to assault human plurality by destroying a group as such. 
At this point, however, Lemkin stumbled in his quest for a pure 
definition of genocide that would single it out from other mass atrocities. Under 
the pure form of this definition, it is possible that nobodynot even Hitler or 
Bagosorawould be guilty of genocide. Hitler planned to annihilate all the Jews 
in Europe, but there is no reason to suppose that he planned to destroy the Jews 
in the Americas as well. In his hatred and madness he may have wanted to do so, 
but so far as we know he never planned to do so, and without a plan there is no 
intention. In the same way, the architects of the Rwandan genocide planned to 
kill the Rwandan Tutsis, but not the Tutsis of Burundi or of the Congo.42 
                                                                                                                              
national, religious, or other specific group categories. Nuremberg Charter, art 6(c) (emphasis 
added) (cited in note 37). 
41  Lemkin also had a practical reason for wanting an intent-based definition. It allows prosecutions 
for genocide even before masses of people have been killed, provided that the perpetrator has 
genocidal intent. The crime of extermination, by contrast, presupposes mass killings. The . . . 
intent-based definition was essential if statesmen hoped to nip the crime in the bud. Power, A 
Problem from Hell at 65 (cited in note 28). On Lemkins objection to the term extermination see 
id at 54. Lemkins motivation was similar to the reason for insisting that the numbers 
requirement is misguided. On these issues, however, history has not borne out Lemkins hopes. 
Statesmen never nip the crime in the bud. Indeed, they seldom do anything substantial to halt 
genocide, only to punish it after the fact. 
42  This point is made in the ICTY Appellate Chambers Krstic opinion. Prosecutor v Krstic, Case No IT-
98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 13 (Apr 19, 2004).  
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The drafters of the Genocide Convention understood this, and they 
responded by modifying the definition of genocide to include the attempt to 
destroy a group in whole or in partin part so that the intention to destroy 
only the Jews of Europe or the Tutsis of Rwanda would still count as genocide 
in the legal sense. 
The problem is that once the definition is modified in this way, it loses its 
mooring in the group-pluralist theory of value. A group that is destroyed only in 
part is by the same token a group that survives in part, and so genocide by 
destroying part of a group no longer removes that group from the family of 
man. Genocide by destroying part of a group continues to be a mass hate-
crime, and as such it still contains the distinctive evil of all hate-crimesa 
murderously anti-pluralist motivation on the part of the perpetrator. But it loses 
the special moral-philosophical quality that requires singling it out from all other 
mass killings and mass atrocities.43 In this way, Lemkins definition of genocide 
was compromised from birth: to make the crime prosecutable in a world of 
territorial states, where genocide might occur only in one state or even one 
sector of the state, the law drifted away from the pure group-pluralist vision that 
drove him to distinguish genocide as a crime different from all others. 
Lemkin himself understood this danger, and insisted that by part of a 
group he meant a substantial enough part to have an impact on the group as a 
whole.44 The US Congress went further, specifying that the part destroyed 
under genocide must be substantial enough that its loss would make the group 
no longer viable within the nation.45 But once the group is reinterpreted as a 
group-within-a-given-territory, the difference between genocide and the crime 
against humanity of extermination begins to thin dramatically. That is because a 
group-within-a-given-territory is a civilian population, and everywhere in the 
world that people live among their own group, a civilian population is a group-
within-a-territory. We can observe this thinning of the difference between 
genocide and extermination by comparing Darfur with the first genocide 
conviction to emerge from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
                                                 
43  In saying this, I differ to some extent from an important argument of Allison Marston Danner. 
Danner believes that genocide, because it is essentially directed against a group as such, is more 
serious than a similar crime against humanity, for the same reason that in domestic law a bias 
crime is more serious than the same crime committed without bias. Danner, 87 Va L Rev at 462
67, 47083 (cited in note 25). Her argument agrees with Lemkins, but it does not come to grips 
with the thinning-down of Lemkins group-pluralist theory of value when the attack is localized. 
The special harms that Danner associates with bias crimesthe greater likelihood of group 
perpetration and secondary harms to other members of the victim groupare equally present in 
non-genocidal mass atrocities. 
44  Schabas, Genocide in International Law at 238 (cited in note 20), quoting Lemkins written testimony 
in 2 Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Historical Series 370 (1976). 
45  18 USC § 1093(8) (2000). 
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Yugoslavia (ICTY): the conviction of General Radislav Krstic for the 
massacre of seven thousand Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica.46 
In the conviction of General Krstic the threshold question was what group 
the Serbs under Krstics command intended to destroy. It was not Muslims as a 
whole, or even Bosnian Muslims as a whole. Having no such powers, they 
formed no such plans or intentions. Rather, the Tribunal concluded that the 
Serbs aimed to destroy the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica, a group that (the 
Appellate Chamber explained) had a special symbolic resonance among the 
Bosnian Muslims as a whole because Srebrenica was supposed to be a protected 
enclave.47 In fact, Krstics troops did not even intend to kill all the Bosnian 
Muslims of Srebrenica, only the men of military age. Here, the Tribunal quite 
reasonably concluded that killing these men would destroy the group as a 
whole.48 Furthermore, the Tribunal reasoned that forcible transfer could be an 
additional means by which to ensure the physical destruction of the Bosnian 
Muslim community in Srebrenica. The transfer completed the removal of all 
Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica, thereby eliminating even the residual 
possibility that the Muslim community in the area could reconstitute itself.49 
Compare the ICTYs analysis of Krstics actions with the UN 
Commissions analysis of the events in Darfur. Here, the UN Commission offers 
as evidence against the attribution of genocidal intent the fact that the Janjaweed 
sometimes kill only the men identified as rebels, sparing other men and the 
women in their target villageswhile forcibly expel[ling] the whole 
population.50 Killing men of military age while expelling everyone else sounds a 
lot like Srebrenica. But here, deeds that the ICTY viewed as evidence of 
genocide the UN Commission views as evidence of no genocide in Darfur. So 
too, the ICTY in Krstic observed that [t]he decision not to kill the women or 
children may be explained by the Bosnian Serbs sensitivity to public opinion51 
rather than signaling lack of genocidal intent. The UN Commission, on the other 
hand, cites the failure of the Janjaweed or the Sudanese government to kill off 
the targeted tribes entirely rather than placing them in camps as evidence of no 
genocidal intent, rather than sensitivity to public opinion.52 Again, the similarity 
with Srebrenica is striking, but the ICTY and the UN Commission reach 
opposite conclusions on remarkably similar evidence. 
                                                 
46  Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgment (cited in note 42). 
47  Id at ¶¶ 1516. 
48  Id at ¶¶ 2628. 
49  Id at ¶ 31. 
50  UN Darfur Report at 13031, ¶¶ 51314 (cited in note 1). 
51  Krstic, IT-98-33-A, Judgment at ¶ 31 (cited in note 42). 
52  UN Darfur Report at 131, ¶¶ 51415 (cited in note 1). 
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Two points stand out. First, the comparison between Krstic and the UN 
report suggests the disquieting possibility that the UN Commission ignored the 
case law of genocide in reaching its no-genocide-in-Darfur conclusion (so 
convenient to UN member states that proclaim never again! about genocide 
but dont actually wish to act). Indeed, the other pieces of no-genocide evidence 
cited in the UN Commissions report are so remarkably shabby that they 
reinforce the suspicion that the UN Commission was bending over backwards 
to find no genocide in Darfur. The Commission notes that the Janjaweed have 
refrained from attacking villages where both target and non-target groups live
as though somehow that shows a lack of specific intent to destroy the target 
group as such.53 Obviously, it can just as easily show the opposite: the Janjaweed 
are hostile only to the targeted group, and dont want to risk damage to other 
groups. And the Commission cites an example where a man who willingly gave 
up his camels to the Janjaweed was spared while his brother, who would not 
give up his camel, was killed.54 This, according to the Commission, shows lack of 
genocidal intent. At most, however, it shows that the camel-thieves in this 
incident lacked genocidal intent, not that the Darfur attacks as a whole lacked 
genocidal intent. By the Commissions logic, the fact that Adolf Eichmann at 
one point allowed a trainload of Hungarian Jews to escape to safety in return for 
money is evidence that the Holocaust was not a genocide.55 Single incidents 
prove nothing about organizational plans. 
The no-genocide conclusion is especially striking because the UN 
Commission explicitly states that, given the limitations inherent in its powers, 
it would utilize a standard of proof weaker than proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and indeed weaker than the existence of a prima facie case. The 
Commission concluded that the most appropriate standard was that requiring a 
reliable body of material consistent with other verified circumstances, which 
tends to show that a person may reasonably be suspected of being involved in 
the commission of a crime.56 Admittedly, this is the standard of proof for 
identifying individual perpetratorsbut, logically, it should be the standard for 
identifying crimes as well, because evidence that a person may reasonably be 
suspected of being involved in the commission of a crime must include 
evidence about what crime it is. On this remarkably weak standardreliable 
                                                 
53  Id at 131, ¶ 516.  
54  Id at 131, ¶ 517.  
55  On the Jews-for-money deal, see Raul Hilberg, 2 The Destruction of the European Jews 90308 (Yale 
2003). On this and other such deals, see generally Yehuda Bauer, Jews for Sale?: Nazi-Jewish 
Negotiations, 19331945 (Yale 1994). 
56  UN Darfur Report 1112, ¶ 15 (cited in note 1).  
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 14 Vol. 7 No. 1 
material consistent with verified circumstances that tends to show reasonable 
suspicionit is unfathomable that one would not find genocide in Darfur. 
Second, the comparison of the Darfur Report with Krstic suggests that the 
UN Commission was more faithful than the ICTY to Lemkins uncompromised 
conception of genocide: the Commission was unwilling to concede that a 
selective attack amounts to an assault on a group as such. But the ICTY had 
simply carried to a logical conclusion the compromised conception of genocide 
against a group in part, a group-within-a-territoryand so it was more faithful 
to the law as it actually exists. 
Above all, however, the comparison of Srebrenica with Darfur shows that 
the modified conception of genocide, restricted to individual locales, has 
converged with the crime against humanity of extermination to the point where 
the two are almost interchangeable. Remarkably similar facts lead to a conviction 
for complicity in genocide in Krstic, but to the conclusion that crimes against 
humanity, but not genocide, are being committed in Darfur. 
Admittedly, the distinction between the two crimes persists as a 
definitional matter. A massacre of everyone in a village regardless of what group 
they belong to will be an extermination but not a genocide. But when, as is 
typical in much of the world, people live among their own group, and the one-
group village falls target to atrocities committed by assailants who know very 
well who lives there, even this distinction evaporates. The UN Commission 
concludes that black villages in Darfur are targeted because these tribes 
contain insurgents rather than because the Janjaweed intend to destroy the tribes 
as such.57 But the Janjaweed clearly intend to destroy the tribes in part, that is, in 
the insurgent regions where their villages are located. There may actually be no 
fact of the matter about whether the Janjaweed intend to destroy the group in 
the region as such, or the group in the region because they are the enemy in 
the region. The mens rea distinction between intended and foreseen-but-
unintended consequences makes sense in some contexts, but not when the 
question is whether a category of people falls under attack because of one 
characteristic rather than another, when the two characteristics go together and 
the attackers dislike both. 
IV. THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE PROTECTED GROUPS  
Another definitional difference between genocide and extermination is that 
the crime against humanity can include attacks against any civilian population, 
including mixed populations, whereas genocide must (in the terms of the 
                                                 
57  Id at 131, ¶ 514. 
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Genocide Convention) be directed at certain classes of protected groups
national, racial, religious, or ethnic groups. 
Here, too, however, the law of genocide parts ways with the common 
meaning of the word, and not for reasons that reflect any coherent moral vision. 
The four categories of protected groups resulted from the politics of ratification, 
not from a moral argument that these alone are the kinds of human groups that 
matter.58 Conspicuously absent from the list is the category of political groups.59 
Political groups were included at various stages of the drafting process, but 
ultimately removed from the final text of the Genocide Convention.60 
Particularly vehement in opposing the category was the Soviet Union, which had 
liquidated enemy classes on political grounds in the 1930s, and presumably did 
not want to have that liquidation labeled genocide.61 As a result, the slaughter of 
hundreds of thousands of Communists in Indonesia during 1965, the Year of 
Living Dangerously, ironically does not count as genocide, because 
Communists are a political group.62 Arguably, neither does the Cambodian auto-
genocide, where the targeted groups were designated because of the Khmer 
Rouges peculiar theory of social classes.63 Some international lawyers have 
found legal arguments of dubious soundness to justify describing the 
Cambodian slaughter as genocidebut the very fact that lawyers need to torture 
the language of the Genocide Convention to call the Cambodian events 
genocide shows clearly how far the law deviates from common moral 
classification.64 
                                                 
58  See Schabas, Genocide in International Law at 10506 (cited in note 20). 
59  This is particularly significant because the legal definition of crimes against humanity includes 
persecutions based on group membership including political groups. Rome Statute at art 7(1)(h) 
(cited in note 39). 
60  See Schabas, Genocide in International Law at 10405 (cited in note 20). 
61  Power, A Problem From Hell at 6869 (cited in note 28). 
62  Arthur J. Dommen, The Attempted Coup in Indonesia, 25 China Q 144 (1966); J.A.C. Mackie, 
Konfrontasi: The Indonesia Malaysia Dispute, 19631966 23875 (Oxford 1974). 
63  Steven R. Ratner and Jason S. Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: 
Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy 26775 (Oxford 2d ed 2001). See also Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime 
(Yale 1996); David P. Chandler, The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War and Revolution Since 
1945, 23672 (Yale 1991); Karl D. Jackson, The Ideology of Total Revolution in Karl D. Jackson, ed, 
Cambodia 19751978: Rendezvous with Death 67 (Princeton 1989); Elizabeth Becker, When the War 
Was Over: The Voices of Cambodias Revolution and Its People 20507, 26465 (Simon & Schuster 
1986). 
64  An example of such an argument is the claim that because Cambodia represents an auto-
genocide committed by Khmers against Khmers, the Khmers themselves would constitute the 
targeted national group. See Schabas, Genocide in International Law at 11819 (cited in note 20); 
Ratner and Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law at 28588 (cited in 
note 63). (Of course, on the reasoning of the UN Darfur Commission, the fact that individual 
Khmer Rouge soldiers did not commit suicide, and thereby spared some Khmers, would be 
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The category of nationality also raises troubling questions. Lemkin meant it 
to refer to national minorities, but in that case the term seems redundant with 
ethnicity. Nationality might also refer to citizenshipin which case it represents 
only a lawyers term of art, an artifact of immigration and naturalization statutes, 
not a morally significant grouping of humanity. Finally, it might refer to the 
inhabitants of a nations territory. If so, however, it hardly differs from the 
concept of a civilian population in the definition of crimes against humanity. 
Ethnicity, as the UN Darfur Report makes clear, has also departed in its 
legal meaning from the theory of group pluralism that animates Lemkins 
singling out of genocide as a special kind of crime. The evolving case law has 
moved from defining ethnicity by objective characteristics such as shared 
language and culture to subjective self-identification (we Tutsis are an ethnic 
group if we think of ourselves as one)and, crucially, to identification as an 
ethnic group by others, namely the persecutors.65 Here, the crucial development 
emerged in the ICTYs Jelisec judgment, which argued: 
[I]t is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or racial 
group from the point of view of those persons who wish to single that 
group out from the rest of the community. The Trial Chamber consequently 
elects to evaluate membership in a national, ethnical or racial group using a 
subjective criterion. It is the stigmatisation of a group as a distinct national, 
ethnical or racial unit by the community which allows it to be determined 
whether a targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or racial group 
in the eyes of the alleged perpetrators.66 
Although it makes sense to view ethnicity from the perpetrators point of 
viewit is, after all, the perpetrators intent that makes the crime a genocide
doing so abandons a central idea behind Lemkins definition of genocide that 
membership in the ethnic group is an important source of value for the human 
community. After all, the identification-by-others test of ethnicity implies that 
the ethnic group may exist only in the imaginations of its persecutors. 
                                                                                                                              
evidence of no auto-genocide.) Ratner and Abrams point out that a strong case exists that the 
Khmer Rouge committed genocide against several ethnic and religious minorities; the legally 
problematic case concerns the Khmer auto-genocide, which was the predominant part of the 
atrocity. 
65  UN Darfur Report at 12527, ¶¶ 49499 (cited in note 1). Highlights of the case law are Prosecutor 
v Akayesu, Case No ICTR 96-4-T, Opinion of Chamber I, ¶ 513 (Sept 2, 1998), which defines an 
ethnic group objectively, as a group whose members share a common language or culture; the 
expansion to subjective selfor otheridentification in Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case 
No ICTR 95-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 98 (May 21, 1999), according to which an ethnic group is one 
whose members share a common language or culture; or, a group which distinguishes itself as 
such (self-identification); or, a group identified as such by others, including perpetrators of the 
crimes (identification by others); and Prosecutor v Jelisic, Case No IT-95-10-T, Opinion of Trial 
Chamber I, ¶¶ 7071 (Dec 14, 1999), which defines ethnicity exclusively by stigmatization by 
others. 
66  Jelisic, IT-95-10-T, Opinion of Trial Chamber I at ¶ 70. 
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In other words, there is no longer a principled reason for insisting that only 
the categories of groups enumerated in the Genocide Convention deserve 
protection because they have special value over and above the aggregated value 
of their individual members. Indeed, some scholars have proposed broadening 
the protections of the Genocide Convention to other groups, possibly to any 
group,67 and its jurisprudence has already broadened the protected categories to 
some degree (for example, by including tribes). The broader the categories 
become, the closer the legal concepts of a protected group under the Genocide 
Convention and a civilian population under the law of crimes against 
humanity draw to each other. 
The fact is that extermination means destroying a group, and it simply 
makes no sense to slice the metaphysical baloney so thin that there is a 
difference between an exterminative attack on a civilian population in a given 
territory and an intentional destruction of a group in that territory. They are two 
names for the same thing. 
The larger culture understands this far better than the lawyers do. When we 
read about mass killings and rapes launched against civilian populations, we 
think that that is genocide. When, in addition, we are told that these killings 
amount to extermination, we know it is genocide. If the lawyers tell us that it is 
not genocide because the group is not being exterminated as such but only 
because they are insurgents, or farmers, we can only shake our heads at the 
obtuse casuistry of the lawyers.68 
The irony is that Lemkins word, fashioned with exquisite fastidiousness, 
has now become the enemy of Lemkins life work, and the friend of politicians 
seeking cover for inaction.  
                                                 
67  Schabas, Genocide in International Law at 10203, 14850 (cited in note 20). 
68  For this reason, I differ with Diane Amanns argument that because of the understanding, shared 
by jurists and lay public alike, that genocide is the most awful crime, it follows that jurists must 
be careful not to depart from the group mentality element of the Genocide Conventions 
definition (by which Amann refers to the specific intent element, which requires consciousness 
that one is aiming to destroy a protected group as such). See Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, 
Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 Intl Crim L Rev 93, 142 (2002). I am suggesting that in our lay 
understanding, what singles genocide out as the most awful crime is not the group mentality 
element, but that it involves an exterminative attack on a groupa property shared by genocide 
and the crime against humanity of extermination. Otherwise, as Amann correctly observes, 
concentrating on what to call an atrocity unduly diverts attention from the important task of 
combating atrocity. Id at 114. Focusing on the group mentality element makes sense under 
Lemkins group-pluralist value in its pure form, but not under its compromised form, where the 
relevant group is a group-within-a-territory. 
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V. CONCLUSION :  REDEFINING GENOCIDE  
It is high time to revisit and revise the definition of genocide, to bring it 
into line with its moral reality. Of course, there is a grave danger in reopening 
the Genocide Convention and the Rome Treaty of the ICC. Once they are 
reopened, everything in them is up for grabs, and who knows what the result 
will be? Furthermore, confusion might result from tampering with a legal 
formula that is now firmly settled in the jurisprudence of many nations and the 
international tribunals. 
Fortunately, the modification I have in mind will not require any 
fundamental changes in the legal formula for genocide. We should leave the 
language of the Genocide Convention intact. Genocide will still consist of five 
specified ways of destroying a protected group, with specific intent to destroy it, 
in whole or in part, as such. The change will simply be to append to this 
definition an additional seven-word clause: or the crime against humanity of 
extermination. 
The idea is not to water down the concept of genocide, but to upgrade 
the legal category of extermination by recognizing that it has the same core 
meaning as genocide, and equal claim to the designation as the crime of 
crimes. Article II of the Genocide Convention would now read:  
In the present Convention, genocide means  
(A) any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (i) Killing 
members of the group; (ii) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; (iii) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; (iv) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(v) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group;  
or 
(B) the crime against humanity of extermination. 
In other words, mass killings in the course of a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population, resulting from a state or organizational policy 
(the legal formula for the crime against humanity of extermination) should count 
as genocide. And now, the estimated four hundred thousand dead in Darfur will 
no longer fall short of genocide, even in the Herald Sun of Melbourne. Sudan 
will no longer be cleared of genocide, even in the Glasgow Herald. And one 
world-wide excuse for inaction in the face of mass atrocity will no longer weigh 
on the conscience of the legal professions. 
